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Abstract
Conflict-related sexual violence has become increasingly recognized in international 
spaces as a serious, political form of violence. As part of this process, distinctions 
between the categories of ‘sexual violence’ and ‘torture’ have blurred as scholars and 
other actors have sought to capitalize on the globally recognized status of torture in 
raising the profile of sexual violence. This move, while perhaps strategically promising, 
even already fruitful, prompts us to heed caution. What might we inadvertently engender 
by further pursuing such positioning? While torture and sexual violence have both been 
widely framed within the academic literature as strategic in recent decades, only torture, 
and not sexual violence, has emerged from elements of this literature as (potentially) 
legitimate, despite the slippages between them as categories of violence. This article 
offers one avenue for thinking through what an invigorated focus on sexual torture as 
a category of violence might unwittingly render possible, and thus for reflecting on the 
possible stakes of collapsing the categories of sexual violence and torture. Ultimately, 
we argue that we should perhaps resist the urge to frame sexual violence as torture 
and instead cleave to the sticky signifier of ‘the sexual’, despite the ways in which it has 
served to normalize, perpetuate and obfuscate grievous harms throughout history.
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Introduction
A member of an armed group forces a civilian prisoner to rape his daughter and son; a 
soldier sodomizes and mutilates several women during a village raid; a commander 
impregnates a young girl kept as his sexual slave; a doctor applies electric shocks to the 
testicles of a suspected terrorist. Such acts can be understood as sexual violence, sexual 
torture or simply torture, depending on the definition employed. They all target body 
parts associated with sexuality. All are likely to meet accepted definitions of both torture 
and sexual violence. All surely cause massive harm to victims/survivors. While such 
atrocities have occurred in war throughout history, their specificity as ‘sexual’ and their 
status as particularly egregious and unacceptable acts that accompany armed conflict 
have been firmly established in the global policy architecture in recent years (Crawford, 
2017; Eriksson Baaz and Stern, 2013; Hirschauer, 2014; Kirby, 2012). This long-overdue 
attention has ushered in increased efforts to understand, theorize, categorize and distin-
guish between the forms, logics, acts and effects of sexual violence. Among other devel-
opments, it has led to the existence of deliberate and explicitly politically strategic efforts 
on the part of feminist scholars to merge the categories of sexual violence and torture, as 
well as an increasing understanding in international spaces that many harmful acts fall 
into both. Indeed, many advocate for recognizing (particular forms of) sexual violence as 
torture — either in labelling as ‘sexual torture’ those acts that fulfil the definitions of both 
categories (such as those noted earlier) (Edwards, 2011: 224–226; Hayes, 2010: 137; 
Henry, 2011: 74–75), or in re-conceptualizing all sexual violence as torture (MacKinnon, 
2006; Pearce, 2003). The stakes of these efforts to position (some/all) sexual violence as 
torture lie in their attempts to gain recognition for sexual violence as a serious and 
extraordinary form of political violence by taking advantage of the recognized profile of 
torture (Edwards, 2011: 257). This move, while perhaps strategically promising, even 
already fruitful, prompts us to heed caution. What might we inadvertently engender by 
further pursuing such positioning?
While torture and sexual violence have recently both been widely framed within the 
academic literature as strategic, only torture, and not sexual violence, has emerged from 
elements of this literature as (potentially) legitimate. Torture largely remains both pro-
hibited and taboo as a modern form of violence in academic scholarship, global policy 
arenas and among people more generally; nonetheless, its use in the US-led Global War 
on Terrorism has prompted an academic debate about its instrumental — and even moral 
— value as strategy in this US context (which we term the ‘torture as strategy’ debate). 
This resurgent debate includes deliberations about the potential legitimacy of torture as 
a mode of political violence (e.g. Levinson, 2004). While it has incurred considerable 
critique (both within the instrumental logic in which it is framed and from scholars 
appalled by its ethical depravity and political ramifications), this debate nonetheless per-
sists. Despite the many ways of framing it in both policy and academic conversations, 
sexual violence, on the other hand, is consistently cast as firmly illegitimate and indefen-
sible in modern (read: ‘civilized’) warfare — regardless of the particular military context 
or theatre of war. Hence, despite the existing intermeshings, even the collapse, of the 
categories of sexual violence and torture in academic debate, important lines of distinc-
tion remain.
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In this article, we consider the conditions of possibility, as they emerge from the ‘tor-
ture as strategy’ debate, for positioning one form of violence (torture) as possibly legiti-
mate and even morally just, while another (sexual violence) remains illegitimate, despite 
the slippages between them as categories of violence. Our aim is to offer one avenue for 
carefully thinking through what an invigorated focus on sexual torture as a category of 
violence might unwittingly render possible, and thus for reflecting on the possible stakes 
of collapsing the categories of sexual violence and torture.
We develop our line of query in four sections. First, we trace associations between 
rationality and legitimacy and present the basic line of reasoning through which torture 
is positioned as (potentially) legitimate within the ‘torture as strategy’ debate. Second, 
we offer a brief outline of our methodological approach. Third, we discuss the categories 
sexual violence/rape, sexual torture and torture, as well as their intermeshings and over-
laps. Fourth, while keeping in mind the conditions of possibility for disposing torture as 
a legitimate form of violence identified in the first section, we trace in broad strokes 
some of the limits of these categorizations as they emerge in scholastic conversations 
around conflict-related sexual violence, sexual torture and torture as strategy. We are 
thus able to see how associations with pleasure/cruelty, the body, emotion, the private 
sphere and irrationality work in distinguishing between forms of violence (or even 
between sex and violence) and, ultimately, must be seemingly erased in order for vio-
lence to be positioned as legitimate and/or just. To conclude, we suggest that in catego-
rizing sexual violence as torture, or delineating certain forms/acts of (sexual) violence as 
sexual torture, we lamentably may open up space for framing such violence as a poten-
tially legitimate tactic of warring.
Framing torture as ‘legitimate’
Our reasoning rests on the recognition that, deeply engrained into post-Enlightenment 
Western thinking, there is an association between rationality, the mind, public space and 
masculinity, and that these interlinked signifiers are positioned in binary opposition to 
irrationality, the body, private space and femininity. For Descartes (1960), the body is 
merely physical matter, an inert object that exists in space and obeys the laws of physical 
science; the mind, in contrast, is a thinking substance that transcends physical space 
(Crossley, 1995: 44). In this ‘Cartesian duality’, the mind has the capacity for thought, 
reason and rationality; the body emerges as a realm both separated from the mind and 
devoid of reason — it is ‘merely the crude container of the mind’ (King, 2004: 31). The 
assumption of a dichotomous relationship between the rational mind and irrational body 
not only has ‘dominated the structure of our thinking and social practices since the 
Enlightenment’ (Prokhovnik, 2002: 4; see also Pin-Fat, 2013), but moreover is deeply 
gendered, with the rationality of the mind associated with masculinity and the irrational-
ity of the body with femininity (Prokhovnik, 2002: 1; see also Grosz, 1994; King, 2004: 
31).
This divide between mind/rationality/masculinity and body/irrationality/femininity 
further maps on to the gendered spatial imaginary of the public–private divide. As mul-
tiple feminist scholars have argued, the distinction between ‘public’ and ‘private’ spaces 
and forms of violence is neither fixed nor inevitable, but fluid, contingent, politically 
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formulated and, importantly, gendered and gendering, with private space frequently 
associated with the feminine and public space with the masculine (Massey, 1994; 
Pateman, 1988). Moreover, the public sphere emerges in Western thought as a space in 
which the rational mind is exercised in political debate; the private, in contrast, is a space 
of ‘passion or desire’, in which ‘rationality [has] no place’ (Evans, 2001: 220). Many 
have convincingly argued that the association of ‘the sexual’ (and, indeed, of women, 
who make up the majority of the victims of such violence) with the private, domestic 
sphere, as well as with the ‘irrationality’ of the (sexual) body, has long contributed to the 
exclusion of sexual violence from the recognized category of ‘public’, ‘political’ vio-
lence (Bunch, 1990; Charlesworth et al., 1991; Hirschauer, 2014; Pearce, 2003).
While the interwoven gendered dichotomous relationships between mind/rationality/
public and body/irrationality/private have been widely recognized, we seek to make an 
additional connection to this chain of signifiers by linking ideas about the ‘legitimacy’ 
and ‘illegitimacy’ of particular enactments of violence in order to interrogate the condi-
tions of possibility through which, within particular debates, torture is rendered as poten-
tially legitimate in the context of war and international politics. The literature on torture 
is large and diverse, and we divide it into three main subsections: the ‘torture as strategy’ 
literature, which weighs the morality of torture from the assumption that it ‘works’ as a 
method of strategic violence; literature which argues that it does not ‘work’; and critical 
scholarship, which rejects the question of torture as strategic violence at all. We focus on 
the ‘torture as strategy’ literature, and argue that within this body of work, (particular 
instances of) torture come to be framed as falling into the mind/rationality/masculinity/
public side of the dichotomy. That is, ‘legitimate’ torture is cast by its proponents as 
contained, proportionate and deliberately and clinically deployed in the pursuit of a 
rational political aim; violence driven by desire, emotion or irrationality, according to 
such lines of reasoning, cannot be legitimate in the context of armed conflict.1 Let us 
explain.
The accepted international definition of torture requires that it is perpetrated with 
intent: this is a deliberate form of violence (Sussman, 2005: 5) perpetrated in the pursuit 
of a particular, instrumental aim (Blatt, 1992; Harries, 2009: 41; Peel, 2004: 11). While 
multiple potential aims are recognized in the literature (see Harries, 2009; Onuf, 2009; 
Wisnewski, 2010: 7–8), most ‘torture as strategy’ literature, as well as that which argues 
that it does not in fact ‘work’, frames torture (including sexual torture) as something 
primarily intended to cause its victim to divulge some desired piece of information (e.g. 
Bagaric and Clarke, 2007; Derschowitz, 2002, 2003, 2004; Elshtain, 2004; Harel and 
Sharon, 2008; Meger, 2016; Parry, 2004: 153; Posner, 2004; Sussman, 2005; Walzer, 
2004). This instrumental understanding of torture underpins debate around its legitimacy 
and morality, in which some scholars contend that (non-sexual) torture, while abhorrent 
and undesirable, can nonetheless be justified in exceptional circumstances in an interna-
tional system characterized by non-state violent actors such as transnational terrorist 
networks (Meisels, 2008).
Most often, ‘torture as strategy’ scholarship argues for the potential morality of torture 
through the ‘ticking time bomb’ scenario: a thought experiment in which a prisoner with 
knowledge of an imminent, large-scale terrorist attack will disclose information neces-
sary to prevent it only if tortured. Harel and Sharon (2008: 242–243), for example, argue 
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that while torture must never be permitted by law or principle, in ‘ticking time bomb’ 
circumstances its use to ‘prevent massive loss of innocent lives’ ‘may be permissible or 
even mandatory’. It is thus not only possible, but morally right, to ‘defend a categorical 
prohibition on torture while also allowing that torture may be necessary when circum-
stances are extreme’ (Harel and Sharon, 2008: 249). This idea — that torture should 
remain subject to a blanket legal ban but should nonetheless be used extra-legally in 
exceptional circumstances — is advocated by multiple scholars (e.g. Allhoff, 2005; 
Bellamy, 2006; Elshtain, 2004; Miller, 2005; Parry, 2004; Posner, 2004; Walzer, 2004). 
In a slightly different vein, Dershowitz has argued that because torture is already being 
used by US personnel under the radar and therefore with impunity, it would be better to 
legally regulate it by requiring that a ‘torture warrant’ be granted for its use (Dershowitz, 
2002: 131–163; see also Dershowitz, 2003, 2004). Such arguments rely upon a belief 
that torture works as a rational and effective way to gather information (Bagaric and 
Clarke, 2007: 12–13, 54–61; Derschowitz, 2002: 137; Krauthammer, 2004: 314).2
According to this line of reasoning, contemporary enactments of torture can be framed 
as (potentially) legitimate — but, as we argue later, only when they are seemingly 
abstracted from associations with bodily pleasure and irrationality. This is not to say that 
actual instances of torture are devoid of cruelty/pleasure or irrationality on the part of the 
torturer. The infamous photos of US soldiers’ torture of prisoners at Abu Graib, for 
instance, cast serious doubt on claims of rational, distanced torture in the Global War on 
Terrorism. Indeed, scholars across multiple disciplines have charted the pleasures found 
in the perpetration of violence, including the violence of war. In disciplines such as psy-
chology and criminology, for instance, the notion that serial killers, in particular, enjoy 
killing prevails (e.g. Myers et al., 2006). Scholars studying war and militarism have also 
addressed the melding of pleasure/cruelty/desire with military violence (see, e.g., Crane-
Seeber, 2016; Dyvik, 2016; Higate, 2012; MacKinnon, 1993). Bourke, notably, points: 
to the ‘spiritual resonance’ and ‘seductive beauty’ of killing in battle; to the ‘intense feel-
ings of pleasure’ that it engenders; and to servicemen’s narrating of killing as a ‘turn on’ 
(Bourke, 1999: 13, 2–3, 20, 335). These are the stuff of many a Hollywood movie and 
war novels, as well as of personal accounts of warfare. Similarly, one could point to 
preceding logics of torture that rested on dehumanization, such as those that underpinned 
the violence of slavery and colonialism, which celebrated or at least encouraged cruelty; 
these logics clearly persist in thinly shrouded forms, and serve to erect a binary between 
civilized and uncivilized warring (see, e.g., Blakely and Raphael, 2017; Turner, 2018).3 
Torture’s role in previous forms of governing also did not refuse or expunge pleasure on 
the part of the torturers or spectators of torture; indeed, as Mavelli (2016) explains, the 
intentional, public inflicting of suffering was part of the production of sovereign rule. 
Despite this, and following Bourke’s observation that a comprehensive reflection on kill-
ing and its pleasures is often expunged from dominant understandings of modern war 
(Bourke, 1999: xiv; see also McSorley, 2013; Scarry, 1985: 63–64), we suggest that 
‘torture as strategy’ narratives that seek to present torture as legitimate do so by rhetori-
cally detaching it from any association with the irrationalities, unruly bodily experiences 
and terrible pleasures that characterize the tangled swamp of wartime violence (Herzog, 
2009). Or, in other words, we hold up to critical scrutiny the discursive removal of such 
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associations that are required in the framing of (some instances) of torture as rational and 
just.
The connection between reason, rationality and legitimacy in modern warring and the 
use of force has a long history in political thought (see Evans and Carver, 2017) and is 
grounded in ideas about international law and sovereign authority in the modern liberal 
state (Weber, 1965; Wolff, 1969). The associations between rationality and legitimacy, as 
they are being evoked in the ‘torture as strategy’ line of argument, are thus anchored with 
the weight of a long history of ideas. Further, ideas about principles of right that are dis-
cernible by the rational liberal subject underpin modern secular just war theory, which 
holds that the violence of war is only morally justifiable when it is limited and restrained, 
targeted at specific and rationally selected targets, and carried out in the pursuit of rea-
sonable political aims (Elshtain 1987: 150; see also Johnson, 1981; Walzer, 1992). In 
making distinctions between legitimate and illegitimate violence in the context of war, 
then, ‘legitimacy’ relies upon the understanding that an act is rational and pursued for 
intended political aims (and is thus associated with the public and with masculinity).4 As 
Cohn (1987) has further compellingly demonstrated, the language of rationality can 
serve to make even highly irrational forms of violence, such as nuclear war, appear rea-
sonable and restrained (see also McSorley, 2013).
A brief note on methodology
The sites we interrogate include academic work that focuses on sexual violence, torture 
and/or sexual torture from across the interrelated disciplines of International Relations, 
political science and political philosophy, and international legal studies. Clearly, how-
ever, scholarship does not take place in hermetically sealed spaces; rather, it is both 
shaped by and influences wider discussions and events. For example, academic debates 
are informed and underpinned in important ways by international jurisprudence as this 
provides the basic scaffolding through which scholars approach categories of violence. 
We therefore refer to some key judgments and legal definitions for the purposes of pro-
viding background and context, yet we neither claim to cover all relevant jurisprudence 
nor include a critical reading of international law in our analysis.5
Academic debates around conflict-related sexual violence have been increasing across 
multiple disciplines since the Yugoslav wars and the Rwandan genocide, and the subse-
quent International Criminal Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and for Rwanda 
(ICTR). While our reading has included the wide field of scholarship on conflict-related 
sexual violence, we highlight the explanatory framework of ‘rape as weapon of war’, 
which corresponds snugly with moves in the global policy arena to recognize sexual 
violence as a security issue (e.g. Hirschauer, 2014). Likewise, literature on sexual torture 
has also become a burgeoning field, both within feminist theory and more broadly. As 
noted earlier, we see an increasing move in the policy/advocacy arena towards framing 
sexual violence as sexual torture (see Edwards, 2011; McKinnon, 2006) — notably also 
in terms of offering a language for paying attention to sexual violence against men 
(Dolan, 2018; Touquet and Gorris, 2016). Further, as we noted earlier, while literature on 
torture is significant and multiple, we focus in this article on the ‘torture as strategy’ lit-
erature because of its influence beyond the academic realm — in public and media 
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discourse (e.g. Goldman and Craighill, 2014; Gutting and McMahan, 2015) and in the 
political sphere (Merica, 2017) — and because it allows us to interrogate the role of 
rationality (etc.) in mediating between strategicness and legitimacy in this particular site.
While our arguments emerge from a wide reading, we do not pretend to adequately 
represent the wealth of growing bodies of increasingly diverse and nuanced scholarship 
here. In this sense, our material is not representative of all relevant scholastic conversa-
tions about these forms of violence; instead, we sought to paint a picture of some domi-
nant lines of debate. In our reading of relevant texts, we have noted what distinctions 
between, and the collapse of, these categories within trends of scholastic conversations 
can tell us about how categories of violence become imaginable as viable in warring. Our 
reading of these sites comprises three main and interrelated moves: (1) we paid attention 
to the points of convergence and difference between the categories of sexual violence 
and torture and considered their limits (What underlying assumptions, for instance, ren-
dered them intelligible? What is included/excluded? What is seemingly erased6 and 
how?); (2) we explored the conditions of possibility for rendering torture potentially 
legitimate within a particular scholastic site (the ‘torture as strategy’ debate); and (3) we 
considered these conditions of possibility as they might apply to discussions of sexual 
violence and torture. We do so in order to explore the impossibility of sexual violence 
being rendered legitimate within the limits of overarching storylines about sexual vio-
lence, most particularly the notion of rape as a weapon of war. Ultimately, through this 
threefold method of reading, we asked: how/why can one form of violence (torture) be 
seemingly rendered plausible as a legitimate strategy, even just, and another (rape/sexual 
torture) be seen as a monstrous blight on modern warfare that is both morally reprehen-
sible and absolutely not ‘ok’ under any circumstances — especially when the lines of 
distinction between these forms of violence are blurry at best? What do our answers to 
these questions imply for the call for recognizing sexual violence as torture?
Categories of violence? Slippages, contractions, collapse
Our discussions stem from the understanding that categories of violence do not fall 
unproblematically or apolitically into neat, predefined or mutually exclusive categories 
that are pinned down in any final sense. Understanding, theorizing and categorizing the 
forms, logics, acts and effects of violence, as well as violence writ large, is a vast and 
fraught endeavour as violence is a slippery concept (Zalewski and Runyan, 2013: 296–
298). In exploring how violence is categorized, we begin from the accepted international 
legal definitions as these definitions generally underpin (whether explicitly or implicitly) 
the operationalization of torture and sexual violence in academic texts, but are not often 
subjected to critical analysis within them. Indeed, it may be comforting to scholars of 
conflict-related violence to think that because torture and rape/sexual violence are 
defined in international law, we know what they are and therefore can argue, for example, 
for acts to fall into particular categorizations without subjecting these categorizations 
themselves to critical scrutiny; however, these seemingly solid definitions slip and slide 
about in multiple ways. That is, as is widely recognized by critical (legal) theorists (see 
Kairys, 1982), even legal categories of harm are not encased by ‘hard lines, as though 
they located and mirrored some inevitable ontological reality’ (Pin-Fat, 2010: 121). 
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Indeed, while some of the distinctions drawn may take on the temporary appearance of 
‘hard lines’, upon a closer look, we see that the lines that we rely on to distinguish 
between these categories are (more or less) fluid and shifting, even in legal contexts, and, 
as such, require constant interrogation. In light of this, let us then briefly query prevailing 
legal definitions of torture and sexual violence.
The dominant international definition of torture, the UN Convention against Torture 
and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, defines torture as 
characterized by three key attributes: it involves ‘severe pain or suffering’, and is perpe-
trated in the pursuit of a particular aim (e.g. to obtain a confession), by or with the con-
sent of a ‘person acting in an official capacity’ (UN General Assembly, 1984). Under the 
Elements of Crimes Annex of the 1998 Rome Statute, where we find the dominant inter-
national legal definitions of rape and sexual violence, rape is defined as (various forms 
of) penetration of the body of the victim, and sexual violence more broadly as acts ‘of a 
sexual nature’, which is/are perpetrated by ‘force, or by threat of force or coercion’, by 
‘taking advantage of a coercive environment’ or ‘against a person incapable of giving 
genuine consent’ (International Criminal Court, 2002: 8, 10).
While we clearly cannot represent the full range of legal complexity here, we make 
two points in the following to demonstrate that ‘hard lines’ (Pin-Fat, 2010) between tor-
ture and sexual violence do not exist even in legal spaces and, thus, to underline our 
argument that the ground beneath scholarship on torture and sexual violence must be 
regarded as shifting and subjected to critical analysis. First, torture and sexual violence 
overlap: International Criminal Court (ICC) definitions delineate the act of rape/sexual 
violence but not the crime, and these acts can be tried as a war crime, a crime against 
humanity, an element of genocide or, importantly for our present purposes, a constituent 
act of torture (Edwards, 2011; Weiner, 2013). International bodies including the ICTR, 
ICTY, the European Court of Human Rights and the United Nations’ (UN’s) Committee 
Against Torture have all recognized sexual violence as torture in cases where victims/
survivors have been raped in detention to coerce them into disclosing information 
(Edwards, 2011: 224–226; Hayes, 2010: 137; Henry, 2011: 74–75). This overlap is 
reflected in the category of ‘sexual torture’, discussed later. Second, the slipperiness and 
permeability of the categories are also evident in the degree of clarity as to the content of 
the acts that fall within these definitions. The ICC’s definition of rape does quite mecha-
nistically delimit which bodily actions (can) qualify as rape; however, its definition of 
sexual violence as acts ‘of a sexual nature’ relies upon assumptions about what a ‘sexual 
nature’ comprises (and does not comprise) that are not clearly delineated, but assumed 
known.7 Similarly, the definition of torture omits any specification of the acts that qual-
ify, and instead focuses only on the effects and the circumstances of these acts (Blatt, 
1992). This is, of course, necessary: any attempt to formulate an exhaustive list of acts 
that constitute torture would be both impossible and decidedly undesirable as the crea-
tive ways in which people harm each other will surely always surpass our imaginations. 
Notwithstanding its inevitability, however, this uncertainty has important implications, 
both for judgments in international courts, which have been inconsistent on whether 
particular harmful acts constitute torture (Harries, 2009: 39; Ní Aoláin, 2004; Parry, 
2004: 147–149), and for political manoeuvrings that seek to disqualify certain acts (such 
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as the use of ‘enhanced interrogation techniques’) from the category (Birdsall, 2016; 
Lang, 2009: 8; Wisnewski, 2010: 200–226).
Beyond the legal sphere — as we might identify from the examples that introduced 
this article — there are similarly many points of convergence between the delineated 
categories of sexual violence and torture as they appear in the literatures that we inter-
rogate. In particular, when we look more closely at the harms of these forms of violence 
to the victim as they emerge from the literature, striking overlaps and parallels appear, 
even in cases that do not obviously correspond to both categories. Most notably, scholars 
have identified both torture (e.g. Scarry, 1985; Sussman, 2005) and conflict-related sex-
ual violence (Agger, 1989)8 as an attack upon the humanity and the subjectivity of their 
victims: as violence that ‘destroys a person’s self and world’ (Scarry, 1985: 35). Several 
have explicitly made this connection between torture and sexual violence (Seifert, 1996: 
40; Sussman, 2005). In particular, scholars have approached both forms of violence as 
embodied experiences that destroy the subject, however temporarily, by forcing victims 
to feel complicit in their own violation (Luban, 2007; Parry, 2004: 153; Scarry, 1985: 
47–48; Sussman, 2005: 30).9 Parallels also emerge in understandings of the long-term 
physical and psychological effects of torture and sexual violence on individuals, includ-
ing social and interrelational difficulties such as family breakdown (Dolan, 2009; 
Dorfman, 2004: 6; Edwards, 2011: 220; Henry, 2011: 3; Wisnewski, 2010: 82), and the 
degradation of social norms and even civilization itself (Dorfman, 2004: 9; Meger, 2016: 
69; Wisnewski, 2010: 72). Finally, others have discussed the ways in which these forms 
of violence are similarly implicated in the production of disempowered gendered and 
raced subjectivities in the targeted groups (Briggs, 2015; Eriksson Baaz and Stern, 2009: 
514; Puar, 2005).
Given these seemingly organic overlaps, through what logics do apparent, often 
‘common sense’, distinctions between these categories persist? Feminist scholars have 
compellingly argued that the categories of torture and of sexual violence have histori-
cally been differentiated by the (presumed) gender of their victims: that the category of 
torture was developed based on the experiences of men, and excludes similar violence 
more commonly faced by women (Bunch, 1990; Charlesworth et al., 1991; Edwards, 
2011: 51–71; Pearce, 2003: 537). While sexual violence perpetrated against women is 
commonly recognized as such, that perpetrated against men may be ‘hidden’ under the 
label of torture, obscuring the sexual character of their harms (Dolan, 2014, 2018; 
Charman, 2018; Sivakumaran, 2007). This division, feminist scholars have argued, 
largely centres around the gendered notion of the public–private divide. Violence under-
stood to occur in the (masculinized) public sphere, perpetrated by someone acting in 
‘official’ capacity, comes to be classified as ‘torture’ and as political. Sexual violence, on 
the other hand, has long been understood as belonging in the (feminized, irrational) ‘pri-
vate’ sphere regardless of the actual location in which the act takes place (e.g. in the field, 
road, marketplace, home) or who is perpetrating the act. Sexual violence has thus had a 
long history of being seen as apolitical, being motivated by private desires and therefore 
irrelevant to studies of conflict and of the international (Hirschauer, 2014: 5). While the 
newly found recognition of sexual violence as a weapon of war (further discussed later) 
certainly challenges and even successfully refutes the notion of wartime rape as apoliti-
cal and private, these connotations still linger and arguably undermine its consideration 
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as fully political to the same degree as torture (see Eriksson Baaz and Stern, 2018). 
Moreover, scholars have argued that torture is treated with comparatively greater seri-
ousness than sexual violence in international discourse because of its association with 
the masculine: in Copelon’s words, ‘history teaches us’ that violence against women is 
likely ‘to be treated as of secondary importance’ (Copelon, 2000: 234; see also Edwards, 
2011: 66, 69; MacKinnon, 2006: 21).
Two separate, but interrelated, moves have emerged in academic spaces that counter 
this historical marginalization of sexual violence. First, the category ‘sexual torture’ has 
gained traction to refer to acts that fulfil the accepted (legal) descriptions of both sexual 
violence and torture, that is, acts that are ‘of a sexual nature’ and that involve severe suf-
fering, and are perpetrated in the pursuit of a particular aim, with the involvement of an 
official actor (Blatt, 1992; Canning, 2016: 443; Oosterhoff et al., 2004: 71). In such 
work, sexual torture most commonly emerges as a method by which torture is carried out 
(e.g. Aswad, 1996: 12; Blatt, 1992; Peel, 2004; Pettitt, 2014). What distinguishes ‘sex-
ual’ from ‘non-sexual’ methods of torture is, generally speaking, the body part targeted. 
That is, ‘sexual torture’ emerges as an act that has the same purpose and meaning as 
non-sexual forms of torture but targets parts of the body coded as ‘sexual’. According to 
this reasoning, electric shocks administered to the earlobes, or the gums, feet or fingers, 
is torture; electric shocks administered to the testicles is sexual torture (see Agger, 1989: 
311; Dolan, 2018). Forced feeding of prisoners on hunger strike is torture; forced ‘rectal 
feeding’ — where a ‘nutrient enema’ is forced into a hunger-striking inmate’s rectum 
— is rape (Mowlabocus, 2014). Moreover, in these accounts, sexual violence emerges as 
a particularly effective method of torture: ‘rape is a cheap form of torture which can 
leave little evidence while being brilliantly effective’ (Pearce, 2003: 540; for discussion, 
see Kirby, forthcoming). (Such a notion, of course, builds on gendered assumptions 
about the effects of rape (see Stern and Zalewski, 2009).
Second, some feminist work has sought to define all sexual violence as torture. This 
approach expands the legal definition of torture by including violence perpetrated by 
private actors, arguing that rape is political even without the involvement of an official 
actor. MacKinnon (2006: 22), for example, argues that the purpose of all rapes is main-
taining male dominance: rape is ‘neither random nor individual’, but rather ‘systematic 
and group-based’, ‘defined by the distribution of power in society’. Furthermore, she 
suggests that states are ‘typically deeply and actively complicit’ even in ‘private’ rapes: 
‘The abuse is systematic and known, the disregard is official and organized, and the 
effective governmental tolerance is a matter of law and policy’ (MacKinnon, 2006: 25; 
see also Bunch, 1990: 490–491). Like the positioning of sexual violence as a method of 
torture, the political stakes of moves to position sexual violence as torture lie in seeking 
to capitalize on the recognized profile of torture as an extraordinary form of political 
violence (Edwards, 2011: 66; McGlynn, 2008: 77; Pearce, 2003: 535). While there is 
disagreement about the strategic wisdom of these moves (McGlynn, 2008; Meger, 2016: 
116), they have widely been celebrated as ‘a feminist triumph that should not be under-
estimated’ because of the ways in which they have increased recognition of violence 
against women as a serious and political form of harm (Edwards, 2011: 257).
Hence, the overlaps and points of collapse between these categories invite us to think 
about torture and sexual violence not as two separate forms of harm, but as something of 
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a continuum, with acts more easily identifiable as one or the other at each extreme and a 
far greater collection of violence in the centre, which blurs the idea of a division between 
the two. How and why one then distinguishes between them can be seen, therefore, not 
only as an exercise in categorization (or, at worse, semantics), but as deeply political. If 
we as scholars of violence in International Relations treat the lines of (legal) categoriza-
tions as though they were ‘hard’, we may remain blind to the political and ethical impli-
cations of how these categories are open to slippage, to reinterpretation and to challenge. 
Also, vitally for our purposes here, we may miss how we can understand the closely 
woven relationship between the categorization and the legitimation of violence, whereby 
the logics inherent to one categorization could lapse into another.
In the sections that follow, we explore the work that pleasure/cruelty (and the attend-
ing notion of consent) and rationality do in distinguishing between forms of violence, 
and in ultimately enabling some to emerge as (potentially) legitimate. As we shall see, 
these work both through their discursive erasures and their presence, albeit in different 
ways. While we focus on the premises in the particular debate about torture as strategy 
presented earlier, we follow these logics as they may apply also to discussions of sexual 
violence and sexual torture.
Erasing pleasure, cruelty and the body? Rationality as a 
condition of possibility for the legitimacy of violence
As discussed earlier, the place of pleasure in studies of violence is complex: while it is 
recognized in some sites, it remains, as Bourke (1999) has convincingly argued, mostly 
written out of our scholastic conversations on war, except in reference to more ‘barbaric’ 
warring that takes place in supposedly ‘uncivilized’ places or by deviant individuals.10 
How, then, might pleasure/cruelty and its chain of related signifiers (emotions, the body, 
the private sphere, etc.) and the attendant notion of consent — both its presence and its 
seeming erasure — work in different ways in delineating sexual violence, sexual torture 
and torture? We focus on pleasure (etc.) because in studying how forms of violence are 
rendered intelligible and distinguished from each other, pleasure/cruelty11 and consent 
(to be further explained later) acted as a distinct line of demarcation between forms of 
violence. Lines of demarcation lie, among other things: in the characterization of whose 
pleasure is at stake; in the role that pleasure plays, in either its presence or its absence; 
and in how complete the erasure of the idea of pleasure might be in relation to both per-
petrator and victim/survivor.
One might argue that pleasure and its string of associations have been successfully 
erased from dominant accounts of wartime sexual violence that have recast it as a rational 
strategy (cf. Eriksson Baaz and Stern, 2018). The past decade has seen the establishment 
of conflict-related rape framed as decidedly political, a strategy or weapon of war, in 
contrast to its previous framing as integrally tied to the heterosexual bodily urges and 
cruel pleasures of warring men. While there are many different ways of explaining war-
time sexual violence, and, indeed, the ‘rape as a weapon of war’ narrative has been criti-
cized for being both reductionist and universalizing (Eriksson Baaz and Stern, 2013; 
Hoover Green, 2016; Kirby, 2012), this framing remains dominant in the policy arena, as 
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the 2018 Nobel Peace Prize attests. As Eriksson Baaz and Stern explain, the ‘weapon of 
war’ discourse is held together by four nodal points: the assumption of ‘strategicness’; a 
rational, culpable perpetrator who acts with conscious intent; the idea that rape can be 
stopped; and the gendered understanding that a woman’s sexual ‘purity’ represents the 
sanctity and the borders of her collective, making an attack against her an attack on her 
collective as a whole (Eriksson Baaz and Stern, 2013: 44–62; see also Hirschauer 2014: 
187; for a discussion of how bodies and body parts come to be framed as weapons, see 
Kirby, forthcoming). Hence, the strategic analysis of torture is echoed to a certain extent 
in the framing of wartime rape as a ‘weapon’, which seeks to stop sexual violence by 
refuting it as inevitable and inherent in masculine heterosexuality and by building on an 
idea of the rationality of the agent of rape, be it either the perpetrator or commander.
Despite this widespread strategic framing, however, we could find no academic 
debate over the potential legitimacy of conflict-related sexual violence to parallel that 
around torture. Indeed, such a debate — which might ask (hypothetically!), for example, 
whether sexual violence is the most effective way to destroy the morale of ISIS and, 
therefore, may be morally justifiable in order to end conflict in Iraq and Syria and pre-
vent future terrorist attacks — is largely unimaginable in academic (as well as in public 
or political) discourse. Kirby (forthcoming) offers a compelling argument that framing 
rape as a weapon of war — ‘weaponization’ — has led, among other things, to its being 
framed as a rational weapon, much like other weapons (cf. Eriksson Baaz and Stern, 
2013: 51, 58). While we agree with Kirby on this insightful point, we suggest that pleas-
ure, the irrational and so on continue to haunt12 efforts to frame conflict-related rape as a 
rational tactic of warring. Hence, we suggest that despite the firm move towards fore-
grounding the rationality of the perpetrator, persistent associations with pleasure/cruelty, 
emotions, the sexual and the body arguably unsettle the status of rape as a rational 
weapon of war (Eriksson Baaz and Stern, 2018) and firmly separate it from the possibil-
ity of being considered legitimate or just.
In order to trace how this might occur, we first turn our attention to the question of 
consent. Consent remains an important question in dominant framings of sexual violence 
— an open question in relation to peacetime sexual violence, and one that is firmly and 
pre-emptively answered in the negative in accounts of wartime rape. However, it does 
not seem to be at play at all in framings of torture, even as something pre-emptively 
answered. Debates around sexual violence in peacetime often place consent, in particu-
lar, the lack of it, at the heart of their definitions, as a line between what is legal, moral 
or accepted, and what is not. In popular discourse and legal judgments, consent is the 
hinge around which a particular act is understood as ‘sex’ or, alternatively, as ‘violence’ 
(Dowds, 2018: 6). Consent thus figures as a kind of ‘dividing line’ used to distinguish 
‘good’ from ‘bad’ (Wertheimer, 2003), ‘pleasurable’ from ‘unpleasurable’ (Jones, 2002), 
and morally acceptable from morally unacceptable and/or criminal sex, that is, rape 
(Hurd, 1996). The continuing attachment of definitions of sexual violence to the notion 
of consent maintains and (re)produces a connection between sexual violence and sexual 
pleasure. Simply put, the possibility of consent enables questions about desire and 
(female) sexual autonomy that acknowledge that both individuals might choose freely to 
engage in sexual relations, which would render the act in question ‘sex’ instead of ‘rape’.
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While these debates dominate conversations about sexual violence in national con-
texts and domestic legislation, they appear less prevalently in discussions about wartime 
rape (cf. Dowds, 2018). Notably, while the role and the significance of consent has 
shifted across the definitions developed by and judgments passed at the ICTY, the ICTR 
and the ICC (Dowds, 2018; Hayes, 2010: 140–142), contemporary international rape law 
both requires and presumes lack of consent (Hayes, 2010: 143–144). The contexts of 
war, genocide and/or detention have been interpreted as coercive environments to the 
extent that consensual sexual relations are rendered impossible (Dowds, 2018: 6–7; 
Green et al., 1994; Halley, 2008: 8). Similarly, non-consent is largely assumed in the 
literature in relation to ‘sexual exploitation’ perpetrated by UN peacekeepers against 
local women, even in cases where the ‘victims’ of such abuse claim to have consented to 
sexual relationships (cf. Simic, 2009). This basic premise — that war constitutes a coer-
cive environment in which consensual sex is impossible — resonates in academic 
accounts of wartime rape in which armed men use force to rape unwilling victims, 
whether these accounts are of rape as: war booty (cf. Card, 1996); ‘recreational’ or 
‘opportunistic’ (Enloe, 2000; Meger, 2016); ‘sexual gratification’ (Cohen, 2016); ‘sexual 
satisfaction’ (Aranburu, 2010: 614); practice (Wood, 2018); or a strategic weapon of war 
(Card, 1996). Importantly, in such discussions, because of the resonances with discus-
sions about sexual violence in domestic/peacetime settings, and because of the ways in 
which dominant understandings of (hetero)sexual desire provide the lexicon through 
which we can make sense of such violence (Eriksson Baaz and Stern, 2018), the possibil-
ity of mutual consent and therewith of desire and pleasure lingers as a spectral whisper 
(s/he — the perpetrator or the victim/survivor — wanted it, chose it, agreed to it …), 
even if only in its denial.
The consent/pleasure of the perpetrator of sexual violence appears as assumed, plau-
sible or impossible, depending upon the specifics of the violent act and the frame of 
understanding that one espouses. In some renderings, such as those that position wartime 
rape as opportunistic or as sexual gratification, the question of the consent of the perpe-
trator, and, indeed, of his/her desire and pleasure, remains a non-issue, being assumed 
and therefore beyond the need for critical assessment (e.g. Meger, 2016: 59–61). In 
accounts that frame wartime sexual violence as a strategic weapon of war, there is a little 
room for critically questioning the consent and pleasure of soldiers commanded to rape 
by their superiors; in relation to the blurry category of victims/survivors/perpetrators 
forced to perform sexual acts on themselves or others, consent and pleasure retreat still 
further. Yet, as Eriksson Baaz and Stern (2018) have argued, while questions of the sex-
ual (desire, eroticism and pleasure) are seemingly erased from (some of) these storylines, 
lest they lead us ‘back’ towards evoking an assumption that wartime sexual violence is 
rooted in biology and is therefore inevitable, the persistent stickiness (Ahmed, 2004) of 
the sexual leaves clearly evident traces. Indeed, sexual violence is seen as a particular 
form of violence that is recognizable because of its status as sexual — a form that wields 
its harms through evocations of gender and ideas about sexuality. Regardless of how one 
understands the reasons for rape, it tends to be framed in the literature on conflict as the 
very worst thing that can happen to a woman (or a man), as a ‘fate worse than death’ (cf. 
Halley, 2008) and as a mark of brutality and uncivilized warring (Eriksson Baaz and 
Stern, 2013) — as persistently connected to bodies, emotions and the private sphere. 
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Despite feminist assertions that the motivation for rape ‘has nothing to do with sexual-
ity’, but is rather about power and misogyny (Seifert, 1996: 36), these evocations of 
desire, eroticism, pleasure, the private and the body abide, separating sexual violence 
from other forms of violence. They also abide in the very real ways in which this vio-
lence affects its victims/survivors, irrespective of how we theorize it.
Certainly, when one is referring to the victim/survivor, the possibility of consent/
pleasure is faint and hardly detectable: that s/he would welcome the (brutal) attack of the 
perpetrator seems preposterous, even monstrous as an assertion. Nonetheless, this insin-
uation remains, if again only in the denial that such consent/pleasure is possible: ‘The 
task is not to investigate how women enjoy being raped — we assume that they do not’ 
(Diken and Laustsen, 2005: 122). (A similar statement regarding torture resounds as 
unconscionable.) Reflecting a similar impulse, feminist work has fought to reframe 
victims/survivors of sexual violence from ‘fallen women’ who invited sexual interaction 
to blameless victims of human rights violations, for example, in the case of the so-called 
‘comfort women’ of the Second World War (Ahmed, A.F., 2004; Hein, 1999). Here, the 
act is defined in opposition to it being consensual: it was not an expression of bodily 
pleasure and desire; it was a political violation of rights. The hushed possibility of con-
sent, of desire and therewith complicity remains, poised to unravel any tidy sense that the 
act in question was violence, for if the act is possibly consensual, then questions of the 
sexual — fleshy pleasure, desire and eroticism, even if mixed with danger, brutality and 
pain — are ushered in and unsettle any firm ontological distinction between sexual vio-
lence and consensual sex. That is, despite the strategic framings of sexual violence (as 
torture, as weapon) that increasingly shape how it is interpreted in international discourse 
— as well as those that also frame it otherwise, as, for example, emerging out of domi-
nant gender norms (e.g. Davies and True 2015) — it remains tethered to pleasure and to 
the private sphere as a ‘space of passion or desire’ (Evans, 2001: 220). Ironically, then, it 
is perhaps this (discursive) adherence that prohibits any framing of sexual violence as 
possibly legitimate.
If this is so, how, then, do we make sense of the ways in which pleasure, desire and so 
on inform discussions about torture? The question of pleasure does occasionally arise in 
relation to torture, in particular, around acts easily understood as blurring the boundaries 
between sexual violence and torture, most commonly found in the literature around US 
military torture at Abu Ghraib (e.g. Das, 2008: 290). Much of the public outcry about 
Abu Ghraib was related to the apparent enjoyment of the torturers represented in the 
leaked photographs, which showed personnel smiling and giving the ‘thumbs up’ gesture 
next to detainees who were naked, restrained and/or forced to simulate sex acts (Butler, 
2007: 959; Kozol, 2012: 30). In particular, these representations emerged in relation to 
US Private Lyndie England, who was portrayed as a deviant, feminine lunatic whose 
desires hailed from private sources (unrequited love, unwed pregnancy, ‘compliant per-
sonality’ depression, female hysteria) — and, thus, as the opposite of what the US mili-
tary embodied in its idealized representations (Britain, 2006; Enloe, 2004).
Furthermore, we would do well to recall that the idea of taking pleasure in perpetrat-
ing torture is one that is fairly widespread in lay understandings of the term, where it is 
associated with the idea of excessive and imaginative methods of violence. It is this 
notion that is seemingly removed in efforts to recast torture as clinical, rational and best 
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executed by trained professionals (Luban, 2007: 253). This pleasure/cruelty is firmly 
centred on the perpetrator; insinuations of consent/complicity/desire on the part of the 
victim/survivor remain blatantly absent.13 Similarly, in discussions of torture as strategy 
more specifically, whether someone was forced to torture someone else or actively con-
sented to doing so does not appear as an area of scrutiny or a line of argument, except 
perhaps in discussions addressing sexual torture.14
Importantly, the discourse that positions torture as strategic violence advocates its 
non-sexual forms, and such arguments often draw explicit distinctions between ‘legiti-
mate’ torture and ‘illegitimate’ (sexual) violence. Derschowitz (2003: 148), for example, 
calls for clinical, detached forms of torture, which bear no association with pleasure, 
with sexuality or with parts of the body coded as sexual, specifically, for sterilized nee-
dles inserted under the fingernails. He explicitly contrasts his proposals with the unre-
strained, pleasurable (sexual) torture revealed in the photographs of Abu Ghraib 
(Derschowitz, 2004: 276–277). Particularly relevant to our discussions here, Luban 
(2007: 253) notes that the pretence of the instrumentality of torture, enshrined in the ‘fic-
tion’ of the ticking time bomb, obfuscates that the torturer (whether using sexual meth-
ods or not) is necessarily ‘a cruel man or a sadistic man or a coarse, insensitive brutish 
man’, thus ‘clinch[ing] the great divorce between torture and cruelty’, which, we may 
assume, are otherwise inescapably intertwined.15
To be clear, we are decidedly not claiming that in order to understand torture, the 
focus should be on questions of consent or pleasure/cruelty and so on. Rather, we are 
highlighting a disparity between debates about sexual violence, where the idea of pleas-
ure (etc.) and of consent both explicitly arise and persist as haunting presences in relation 
to both the perpetrator and the victim/survivor, and torture, for which consent does not 
appear, and pleasure only rarely appears, as explicitly relevant, and only in relation to the 
perpetrator of such acts. In short, in composite discussions on conflict-related sexual 
violence, the notion of pleasure/cruelty either persists explicitly or continues to imbue 
sexual violence with meaning through its erasure in particular ways that are tethered to 
notions of ‘the sexual’ (Eriksson Baaz and Stern, 2018). In comparison, torture, to the 
extent that it is more or less successfully framed in the torture as strategy debates, 
emerges as detached, rational and political, cleansed of associations with pleasure/cru-
elty/emotions. The difference seems to be the particular stickiness (Ahmed, 2004) to ‘the 
sexual’ of the continued and palpable association with bodily pleasure — often through 
cruelty, irrationality and the apolitical private sphere (in relation to both the perpetrator 
and the victim/survivor).
Surely, as we have seen, pleasure/cruelty is not completely kept at bay in the torture 
as strategy debate; its erasure or eradication is not fully successful. Yet, without the 
adherent quality of ‘the sexual’ that sticks to these chains of signifiers, ‘torture’ can 
emerge in this debate as possibly rational (enough) to be positioned as a legitimate form 
of violence.16 As we will recall that in order for violence to be framed as legitimate in 
international politics more generally (such as in just war theory), it must be seen as 
rational (McSorley, 2013). Hence, in particular discursive settings, torture can thus take 
its place as a viable (reasonable, even morally and ethically justifiable) method in a par-
ticular strategy of warring, whereas a similar positioning for sexual violence cannot. 
Compounding this, the (potential) legitimacy of torture is likely further enabled by its 
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association with male victims who, as ‘presumptive combatants’ (Carpenter, 2006), fur-
ther tie it to ideas of mind/rationality/masculinity/public, as discussed earlier.
Risky dis/entanglements: or, why does this matter?
Our analysis has sought to understand how it is that while both torture and sexual vio-
lence have been widely framed within academic literature as strategic in recent decades, 
a debate over the potential legitimacy of the deployment of such violence in warfare has 
emerged only in relation to torture. That is, how is it that despite the overlaps between 
these forms of harm, and the ongoing ‘taboo’ against both (and despite the existence of 
much literature arguing against the legitimacy of torture), a debate over legitimacy does 
appear in a subset of the torture literature but remains largely unimaginable in relation to 
sexual violence? In short, we argued that in the ‘torture as strategy’ debate, a claim to 
rationality and emotional distance, as opposed to emotion, bodily desires and cruel pleas-
ures, emerges as the condition of possibility through which (particular acts of) torture are 
positioned as legitimate, even ethical and just. In loosely following the logics set out in 
this debate in our reading of academic texts that consider conflict-related sexual violence 
and sexual torture, we saw how ‘the sexual’ remains so tethered to the body, pleasure/
cruelty and the irrational that a discursive move to cast it as rational arguably ultimately 
fails. Its potential as a possibly legitimate political form of violence stands as preposter-
ous and unthinkable. In light of this, what does our analysis tell us about the stakes of 
collapsing sexual violence and torture into sexual torture or casting all sexual violence as 
torture as a politically infused move?
Given that, as we have argued, the conditions of possibility for the emergence of tor-
ture as ‘legitimate’ include its falling into the categories of mind/rationality/masculinity/
public sphere, our discussions point towards a potentially significant risk inherent in 
attempts to cast conflict rape as (only) strategic, rational violence: successfully further 
separating rape from questions of pleasure/cruelty and so on might enable a debate over 
its strategic legitimacy (cf. Kirby, forthcoming). If such a strategic framing were to be 
truly successful in expunging the associations with pleasure and irrationality from our 
understandings of sexual violence, would rape become subject to the same strategic 
debates as torture? That is, despite the significant drawbacks that feminists have identi-
fied in the associations between sexual violence and the private sphere, their further 
successful separation might risk laying the groundwork for sanitizing sexual violence as 
a legitimate form of harm. In other words, by positioning conflict rape as strategic vio-
lence, do we inadvertently open up space for its legitimization (see also Kirby, 
forthcoming)?
This is a precarious proposition indeed. Years of hard feminist labour have finally 
succeeded in removing from the global academic and policy lexicon the notion of inevi-
table or incidental war rape, firmly establishing it as a political act that must be prevented 
and redressed. This hard-won political ground cannot, and should not, be ceded. 
Nonetheless, not noting how one logic can lapse into another, with potentially disastrous 
unintended consequences, appears as an unsavoury alternative.
This danger, we hold, persists alongside the potential political benefits that might 
emerge through such framing — benefits that also render the flip side to this argument, 
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for example, that the associations with pleasure/cruelty, the body and so on that are high-
lighted in categorizing certain acts as ‘sexual’ render these illegitimate, even abomina-
ble. Following this line of reasoning, our argument would lead us to propose that perhaps 
for these very reasons, we should resist the urge to collapse sexual violence or sexual 
torture into the category of torture, and instead cleave to the sticky signifier of ‘the sex-
ual’, despite the ways in which it has served to normalize, perpetuate and obfuscate 
grievous harms throughout history.
The disparity between the framings of sexual violence and torture thus leads us to 
thorny conundrums for scholars and activists working to raise the profile of conflict-
related sexual violence by attaching it to the internationally recognized violence of war, 
whether through the categorization of sexual torture, of rape as torture or as rape as a 
weapon of war. We neither wish to, nor can settle, these questions and the puzzles they 
pose here. Instead, we hope to invite further pause for reflection — pause that may seem 
superfluous in the heady rush to prevent, arrest and redress the awful harms of sexual 
violence and torture in all of their iterations, but that nonetheless may provide the space 
to identify and ultimately avoid slippery slopes of reasoning that may ultimately cause 
more harm.
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Notes
 1. The perceived illegitimacy of irrational or desire-driven forms of violence in conflict belies 
the prevalence of ‘private’ violence across war and peace.
 2. Counter-arguments suggest that torture does not work as an effective way of gathering reli-
able intelligence and, therefore, that its use cannot be morally justified (see Blakeley, 2007: 
379–381; Langbein, 2004: 97; Luban, 2007: 254; Ramsey, 2006: 114–115, 117; Schultz, 
2007; Shue, 1978: 135, 141–143; Wisnewski, 2010: 130–133, 149–158). Such arguments 
seek to refute the condoning of torture on instrumentalist terms. Its potential rationality per 
se, however, remains.
 3. A more critical literature disputes the assumption that torture is primarily conducted for the 
strategic end of intelligence gathering (e.g. Blakeley, 2007; Luban, 2007; Scarry, 1985: 28, 
35–38, 46, 56–57; Sussman, 2005: 2). This literature frames torture as a performance of 
power (Scarry, 1985: 28, 35–38, 46, 56–7; see also Onuf, 2009: 28) or as a way to shore up 
the stability and legitimacy of elites (Blakeley, 2007). Critics have also noted how Western 
governments have sought to sidestep their anti-torture commitments post-9/11 by reinterpret-
ing definitions of torture in order that ‘enhanced interrogation techniques’ be excluded from 
the category (Birdsall, 2016), and by seeking to retain the appearance of a commitment to 
liberal norms even while participating in or enabling torture (Blakeley and Raphael, 2017).
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 4. A wealth of long-standing scholarship addresses questions of the political legitimacy of vio-
lence (see, e.g., Apter, 1997; Crenshaw, 1983; De Haan, 2008; Smith, 1970). We cannot do 
justice to this literature here.
 5. Our claims centre on the debate in academic scholarship. It is lamentably beyond our scope 
here to fully examine the relationship between torture and sexual violence in international law 
and/or policy.
 6. Like Eriksson Baaz and Stern (2018), we noted erasures in terms of the ‘rubbing out’ 
(Anderson, 2012: 8) of meaning and in the traces that this rubbing out leaves behind and that 
haunt new meaning (Gordon, 2008).
 7. While not explicitly stated in the legislation, it is usually the involvement of particular body 
parts, as target or weapon, which delineates whether a particular act is deemed to be of a 
‘sexual nature’. For a discussion of how body parts can become ‘eroticized’ in the act of 
sexual violence, see Cahill (2001: 139–140).
 8. Scholars of non-conflict-related sexual violence have made similar arguments (e.g. Cahill, 
2001; Du Toit, 2009).
 9. This complicity is framed in several ways: through confession (Scarry, 1985: 47); through 
being forced to put one’s intimate sexual thoughts in the service of torturers (Sussman, 2005: 
22); and through bodily responses (Scarry, 1985: 48, 53; Sussman, 2005: 21, 23).
10. For a further discussion of connections between sexual violence or torture and racialized 
ideas about barbarity that reproduce colonial registers, see, for example, Blakely and Raphael 
(2017), Eriksson Baaz and Stern (2013), Mavelli (2016) and Turner (2018).
11. ‘Indeed, one possible way to define cruelty may be as awareness and enjoyment of the pain 
intentionally inflicted on others’ (Caputo et al., 2000: 662; see also, e.g., Miller, 1990).
12. Haunting in this sense refers to how ‘that which appears to be not there is often a seething 
presence, acting on and often meddling with taken-for-granted realities’ (Gordon, 2008: 8).
13. Mavelli (2016) explains that, historically, public cruelty was justified as also providing possi-
ble redemption for the victim: suffering gave the tortured a chance to ask for forgiveness from 
God. Revelling (pleasurably) in the suffering of the tortured by the torturer or by spectators 
was thus cast as just, in addition to its being a confirmation of the power of the sovereign state.
14. Torturing someone by forcing him/her to (sexually) torture someone else, however, is com-
mon practice in many warring contexts, and the resulting harms to the survivors of such acts 
of violence are devastating (see, e.g., Dolan, 2014; Drummond, 2018).
15. The general paucity of such questions in the debate about torture as strategy, and the appar-
ent ease with which they are brushed aside, is notable. Even in critical literature, explicit 
references to pleasure rarely arise in relation to (non-sexual) torture, and when they do, they 
generally appear only as a minor side point (e.g. Elshtain, 2004: 77; Sussman, 2005: 2).
16. It is important to note that there may be other pertinent factors at work here, in particular, 
the colonial logics through which ‘our’ violence is compared with other violence ‘elsewhere’ 
(Das, 2008: 287–288). Given the comparisons of ‘rational’ torture with the ‘irrationalities’ 
of US military actions at Abu Ghraib, however, it is likely that the factors outlined here are 
also important.
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